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Discovering the determinants of a firm’s ability to cre-
ate value in terms of financial results in a competitive 
environment is central to the strategic management 
field. This is specifically relevant in private family 
firms in which the firm’s survival across generations is 
a primary concern for the family’s well-being. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that family firm research is increas-
ingly focused on factors of competitive advantage and 
family firms’ value-creating potential (e.g., Carney, 
2005; Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2010; Chirico, 
Sirmon, Sciascia, & Mazzola, in press; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003). The resource-based view of the firm is a useful 
framework for studying the sources of value creation. 
The resource-based view emphasizes the bundles of 
unique, valuable, rare, inimitable, and nonsubstitutable 
resources that are at the firm’s disposal as the founda-
tion for value creation (Barney, 1991). However, pos-
sessing resources alone does not automatically lead to 
value creation. Rather, the firm’s resources must be 
managed to create value (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Sirmon, 
Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Accordingly, Eisenhardt and 
Martin (2000) suggest that new value-creating strategies 
are generated by the recombination process of resources. 
This is captured in the concept of dynamic capabilities 
(DCs), through which entrepreneurial change is pro-
moted and new value is created in organizations over 
time (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).
It is important to understand the determinants—both 
positive and negative—of value creation in family firms 
because private family firms are the most common forms 
of organization throughout the world and thus play a 
large role in the world’s economies (Colli, 2003). Family 
firm research has observed the influence of organiza-
tional culture on either promoting or constraining DCs 
and value creation (see, e.g., Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; 
Hall, Melin, & Nordqvist, 2001; Zahra, Hayton, & 
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Salvato, 2004). Seeking to extend this literature, our first 
research question is the following: How and when does 
paternalism affect DCs and by association value cre-
ation in family firms? Paternalism is the practice of 
excessively caring for others so as to interfere with their 
decisions and autonomy thus often producing resistance 
to change. Existing literature tend to depict paternalism 
as a simple dichotomy between benevolent and authori-
tarian behaviors whose results are often contradicting 
(for a review, see Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008).
The family firm is an important context for studying 
the role of paternalism and addressing the previously 
contradicting results, because paternalism has been 
repeatedly observed as a common feature of the family 
firm culture (e.g., Dyer, 1986, 1988; Johannisson & 
Huse, 2000), but its effect on value creation has been 
rarely examined. Drawing on previous exploratory case-
based research (Hall et al., 2001; Salvato & Melin, 
2008), we offer, as a further step in the development of 
knowledge in this area, a system dynamics approach 
that relies on simulation experiments to generate test-
able propositions. Thus, our second research question is 
the following: How can simulation experiments shed 
light on complex decision processes in family firms?
In line with the two research questions, we aim to 
make conceptual and methodological contributions pri-
marily to the field of family business research. First, the 
article sheds light on the circumstances under which 
paternalism is an asset or liability for family firms 
through its impact on DCs and value creation. Second, 
the article offers insights with regard to how systems 
dynamics and simulation experiments in a computer-
based virtual laboratory (see Davis, Bingham, & 
Eisenhardt, 2007; Harrison, Lin, Carroll, & Carley, 
2007) can be used to study the important decision mak-
ing processes and outcomes in family firms. Although 
this article focuses on family firms, we suggest that our 
conceptual and methodological approach may be 
applied to other types of organizations that are charac-
terized by a dominant social group—that is, any group 
possessing its own institutionalized practices, values, 
and behavioral norms.
Theoretical Background
Dynamic Capabilities and the Family Firm
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) suggest that new value-
creating strategies are generated by the recombination 
process of resources, that is, entrepreneurial activities 
designed to acquire, exchange, transform, and at times 
shed resources (see also Dess, Lumpkin, & McGee, 
1999). This is captured in the notion of DCs through 
which change is promoted and new value is created in 
organizations over time. Examples of DCs are “product 
development, alliance formation, and strategic decision 
making that create value for firms within dynamic mar-
kets by manipulating resources into new value-creating 
strategies” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, p. 1106). 
Accordingly, DCs are often depicted as learned and 
stable patterns of collective activity, which materialize 
from social ties between individuals, that is, through 
social capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). They result 
from mechanisms of knowledge sharing, collective 
learning, experience accumulation, and transfer through 
which resources are recombined (Zollo & Winter, 
2002). This approach to resource recombination closely 
resembles the Schumpeterian view of resource configu-
ration whereby entrepreneurial development is defined 
as “the carrying out of new combinations” (Schumpeter, 
1934, p. 66).
However, to realize the potential value of DCs, a 
governance form characterized by close social ties that 
effectively guides the bundling and deployment of 
resources is needed. Sirmon and colleagues (Arregle, 
Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007; Chirico et al., in press; 
Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2010; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) 
suggest that the family firm—which exists when a fam-
ily possesses significant ownership stake in the firm and 
has multiple family members involved in its operations 
(Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008)—is a gover-
nance form that may enable such actions. In family 
firms, family members indeed develop strong and dura-
ble relations through kinship ties. Accordingly, emo-
tional attachment and rational judgment are inseparably 
intertwined, thereby significantly affecting their strate-
gic behaviors (Gómez-Mejía, Haynes, Núñez-Nickel, 
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007; Sirmon & Hitt, 
2003).
A Feedback View of Family Social Capital, 
Dynamic Capabilities, and Value Creation
The concept of social capital is central to the under-
standing of DCs and value creation. Arregle et al. (2007, 
p. 75) define social capital as “the relationships between 
individuals . . . that facilitate action and create value.” 
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Given that DCs emerge from repeated interactions 
between individuals and can be better developed by 
close-knit groups who identify themselves with a larger 
collective (Kogut & Zander, 1992), family firms are an 
interesting organizational form for studying DCs 
(Salvato & Melin, 2008). The interaction of the family 
and the business enables family members to act simul-
taneously within both social systems, thus creating a 
specific context for resource recombination (Sirmon & 
Hitt, 2003). Family firms are indeed characterized by 
socially close relations among family members (i.e., 
family social capital; see Salvato & Melin, 2008), 
which also occur informally outside the work context. 
These relations are developed through a history of inter-
actions and mutual trust that makes it less likely to dis-
credit each other’s ideas and perspectives. The family 
firm structure, based on close interaction of kinship ties 
and reciprocal trust (Stewart, 2003), encourages the 
existence of strong family relations, which in turn 
enable family members to easily integrate their indi-
vidual specialized knowledge to promote action.
Arregle et al. (2007) suggest that family social capi-
tal is one of the most lasting and influential forms of 
social capital given that stability, interdependence, inter-
action, and closure (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) are very 
strong in family firms. Additionally, “[A] common sys-
tem of meanings is usually strongly developed between 
family members, thereby allowing them to discuss and 
exchange information easily and to perform specific 
tasks or activities efficiently and rapidly through pre-
dictable patterns of collective behavior” (Chirico & 
Salvato, 2008, p. 175; Granata & Chirico, 2010). Indeed, 
a “family language” allows family members “to 
exchange more information with greater privacy and 
arrive at decisions more rapidly than can two nonrela-
tives” (Tagiuri & Davis, 1996, pp. 204-205).
According to this logic, high levels of family social 
capital based on trust and benevolence between family 
members promote the evolution of capabilities in the 
family firm as well as its ability to recombine resources 
and respond appropriately to environmental changes. In 
other words, high levels of family social capital should 
support the family firm to generate new value over time. 
For instance, Salvato and Melin (2008) suggest that 
family firms’ ability to create value over time “can be 
understood by considering how family-related social 
capital differentially affects processes of resource 
access, creation, and recombination, which in turn yield 
different strategic initiatives along the exploration/
exploitation continuum” (p. 264). In turn, stronger value 
creation over time may reduce family conflicts and pro-
mote family harmony—in terms of sense of unity and 
connections among family members—thus further sus-
taining the positive role of family social ties on the fam-
ily firm’s development (Eddleston, Kellermanns, & 
Zellweger, 2010). However, previous studies have indi-
cated that family firms also face challenges to keep the 
long-term positive relationship between family social 
capital, DCs, and value creation (Salvato, Chirico, & 
Sharma, 2010). We argue that one important challenge 
is associated with paternalism, that is a common but 
poorly understood cultural feature of private family 
firms (Dyer, 1986, 1988; Johannisson & Huse, 2000).
Paternalism: “Asset” or “Liability”?
Paternalism is the practice of (excessively) caring for 
others so as to interfere with their decisions and auton-
omy (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). In an organizational 
context, paternalism is about being protective and 
dominating in a fatherly way with a strong attitude of 
wanting to preserve the firm’s traditions and not make 
changes. In particular, paternalism is prevalent in cul-
tures that value collectivism (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 
2007) in which each member views himself or herself 
as part of “a larger (family or social) group [focusing on 
‘we’], rather than as an isolated independent being 
[focusing on ‘I’]” (Hofstede, 2001; VandenBos, 2007, 
p. 195).
Family firms tend to be more collectivistic than indi-
vidualistic based on the extent to which they stress sta-
bility, interdependence, interaction, and conformity to 
cultural family traditions (Sharma & Manikutty, 2005; 
Zahra et al., 2004). These characteristics and the fact 
that parent–child work relationships are extensive in 
family firms make paternalism a common cultural fea-
ture of family firms (Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Dyer, 
1986, 1988; Johannisson & Huse, 2000).
Recent research defines paternalism as “a style that 
combines strong . . . authority with fatherly benevo-
lence” (Farh & Cheng, 2000, p. 94; see also Farh, Cheng, 
Chou, & Chu, 2006). Specifically, benevolence refers to 
leader behaviors that demonstrate individualized, holis-
tic concern for subordinates’ personal and family well-
being (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). Accordingly, 
paternalistic individuals provide support, protection, 
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and care to their subordinates (e.g., Redding, Norman, 
& Schlander, 1994) who willingly reciprocate the care 
and protection of paternal authority by showing confor-
mity (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2006). For instance, 
Westwood and Chan (1992) depict paternalism as a 
father-like behavior in which authority is combined with 
concern and considerateness that promote firm perfor-
mance (see also Lim, Lubatkin, & Wiseman, 2010, pp. 
206-207).
Authoritarianism refers instead to leader behaviors 
that assert authority and control and demand unques-
tioning obedience from subordinates (e.g., Uhl-Bien & 
Maslyn, 2005). Accordingly, relationships between par-
ties are based on control and exploitation, and subordi-
nates show conformity solely to avoid punishment. In 
such a situation, the paternalistic leader tends to deny 
her or his subordinates any responsibility and the free-
dom to express ideas and make autonomous choices and 
changes, thus promoting organizational inertia (Dyer, 
1986). In fact, although the parent is presumed to have 
genuine benevolent intentions toward her or his off-
spring, she or he may exercise absolute authority over 
them (Jackman, 1994) that stifles the recombination of 
resources and value creation.
Accordingly, scholars still debate whether paternal-
ism is a cultural “asset” or “liability” for an organiza-
tion’s success. Pellegrini and Scandura (2006) see 
paternalism as an “effective strategy” (p. 268), whereas 
Uhl-Bien and Maslyn (2005) refer to paternalism as 
“problematic and undesirable” (p. 1). We seek to 
advance this debate and understand if and when a cul-
ture that exhibits paternalism fosters (asset) or hinders 
(liability) the family firm social capital, DCs, and value 
creation over time.
We suggest that the four central constructs we have 
discussed here—family social capital, DCs, value cre-
ation, and paternalism—are intertwined by cause–effect 
relationships with a feedback nature. This means that 
over time they may not necessarily generate positive 
outcomes. To fully appreciate the dynamics implica-
tions of feedback links among these constructs, we 
develop a computer-aided formal analysis capable of 
teasing out testable propositions. The feedback loop dia-
gram reported in Figure 1 summarizes the feedback 
causal structures that we have outlined. In Figure 1, the 
arrows indicate the presence of a causal connection 
between pairs of variables, and the signs next to the 
arrows specify the possible nature of the causal relation-
ships (positive, negative, or both) between connected 
variables (Sterman, 2000).
Method
Simulation
Simulation, defined as a virtual experiment that uses 
computer software to model the operation of “real-
world” processes, systems, or events (Carley, 2001; 
Law & Kelton, 1991), is an increasingly significant 
methodological approach in the literature on strategic 
management and organization theory (Davis et al., 
2007; Larsen & Lomi, 2002; Lomi, Larsen, & Freeman, 
2005; Lomi, Larsen, & Wezel, 2010; Sastry, 1997; Zott, 
2003). In particular, simulation involves creating com-
putational representations (as a set of equations) of the 
underlying theoretical logic that links constructs 
together within a simplified world (Fioresi & Mollona, 
2010; Mollona, 2010). These representations are then 
coded into software, through computational algorithms, 
that is run repeatedly for multiple time periods and 
under varying experimental conditions to explore the 
outcomes of interest (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 
2007; Mollona & Marcozzi, 2009a). Simulation allows 
scholars to make assumptions explicit, control/varying 
variables, consider multiple chronological and histori-
cal paths over an extended period of time (Lomi et al., 
2005; Lomi et al., 2010; Mollona & Hales, 2006; 
Mollona & Marcozzi, 2009b). Harrison et al. (2007) 
explain that the objective of a simulation “is to construct 
FAMILY SOCIAL
CAPITAL
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES
+
+ VALUE
CREATION
+
PATERNALISM
+/-
Figure 1. A feedback view
Note. The “+” means that the two variables move in the same 
direction, all other things being equal. The “−” means that the two 
variables move in opposite directions, all other things being equal.
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a model based on a simplified abstraction of a system—
guided by the purpose of the simulation study—that 
retains the key elements of the relevant processes with-
out unduly complicating the model” (pp. 1240-1241).
Several influential research efforts (e.g., Cohen, 
March, & Olsen, 1972; March, 1991) have used simula-
tion as their primary method. Some scholars argue that 
simulation methods contribute effectively to theory 
development. For example, simulation can provide 
superior insight into complex theoretical relationships 
among constructs. In fact, simulation can clearly reveal 
the outcomes of the interactions among multiple under-
lying organizational and strategic processes, especially 
as they unfold over time. In this respect, Hanneman, 
Collins, and Mordt (1995) posit that “we do not really 
know what a theory is saying about the world until we 
have experimented with it as a dynamic [simulation] 
model” (p. 3). From these perspectives, simulation can 
be a powerful method for sharply specifying and extend-
ing extant theory in useful ways and thus generate 
new—often counterintuitive—propositions or hypothe-
ses1 (Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi et al., 2010; Mollona, 
2010).
Why Use Simulation?
The longitudinal and feedback nature of the theoretical 
framework presented in Figure 1 makes deriving its 
implications fairly complicated. It is not intuitive how 
the processes that underpin the feedback model in 
Figure 1 unfold over time to yield different organiza-
tional outcomes. In this line, in our study, we relied on 
simulation rather than on direct data analysis for three 
reasons.
First, as Larsen and Lomi (1999) explain “[T]he sta-
tistical machinery used in empirical research is func-
tional to what we can call -a single-proposition approach 
to the study of organizations” (p. 412). In other words, 
statistical methods often do not enable scholars to study 
the constructs of interest simultaneously. Researchers 
are forced to examine the effects of some variables to 
others instantly with a clear distinction between depen-
dent and independent variables and without considering 
time delays that characterize economic and social rela-
tions (Larsen & Lomi, 1999; Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi 
et al., 2010). For this reason, simulation is particularly 
useful for the present study. Indeed, our theoretical 
model involves interacting processes, time delays, and 
feedback loops. Long-term effects that are difficult to 
uncover using other methods can emerge so as to explore 
and extend existing theories (Rivkin, 2000; Rudolph & 
Repenning, 2002).
Second, simulation methods enable analyses across a 
broad variety of conditions by merely varying the com-
puter codes (Bruderer & Singh, 1996; Davis et al., 2007; 
Larsen & Lomi, 1999; 2002; Lomi et al., 2005; Zott, 
2003). Such adjustments are usually challenging in 
empirical research, particularly after the data are col-
lected. Indeed, simulation creates a computational labora-
tory in which researchers can systematically experiment 
(e.g., unpack constructs, relax assumptions, vary con-
struct values, add new features) in a controlled setting to 
produce new theoretical insights. This experimentation 
is particularly valuable when the theory seeks to explain 
longitudinal and processual phenomena that are chal-
lenging to study using statistical methods because of 
data limitations such as in our case (Zott, 2003). In fact, 
paternalism has been studied in a family firm context, 
but its evolutionary path within and across generations 
has not been fully explored because of data limitation.
Finally, another important strength of simulation 
research in general and specifically for our study is 
internal validity (Campbell & Stanley, 1966). Creating a 
computational representation involves the precise speci-
fication of constructs, assumptions, and the theoretical 
logic that is enforced through the discipline of algorith-
mic representation in software (Abelson, Sussman, & 
Sussman, 1996). Also, simulation eliminates the mea-
surement errors associated with empirical data 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
System Dynamics
Several well-known simulation approaches have been 
used in the organization and strategy literature. A well-
known and largely used simulation method is system 
dynamics (Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi et al., 2010; 
Mollona, 2010; Rudolph & Repenning, 2002). System 
dynamics focuses on how causal relationships among 
constructs can influence the behavior of a system over 
time (Forrester, 1961; Sastry, 1997). The approach typi-
cally models a system (e.g., organization) as a series of 
simple processes with circular causality (e.g., variable X 
influences variable Y, which in turns influences variable 
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X). These processes have some common constructs and 
so intersect in a set of circular causal loops. These 
causal loops can be positive such that feedback is self-
reinforcing and amplifying or negative such that feed-
back is balancing (Sterman, 2000). Although each 
process may be well understood, their interactions are 
often difficult to predict.
Also, system dynamics is based on the principle of 
accumulation. It states that all dynamic behaviors in the 
world occur when flows (or rates) accumulate in stocks 
(or levels). Stocks accumulate resource flows and repre-
sent the memory of the system (Romme, Zollo & Berendsy, 
2010). Stocks can be modified only by changes in the 
associated flows. Stocks and flows are thus the basic 
building blocks of a system dynamics model, which 
generate delays and enable scholars to analyze the feed-
back loops of the system (Sterman, 2000; see Appendix 
A for more details). The focus on feedback processes in 
which the dependent variables are embedded makes 
system dynamics particularly useful for our study as a 
way of representing phenomena characterized by a 
systematic interdependence among co-occurring causal 
factors.
The Structure of the Model
To set the model in motion and to make the simulation 
results easily replicable, it was necessary to assign 
numerical values to all the parameters and initialize all 
the state variables. The structure of the system dynam-
ics model depicted in Figure 2 contains five stock vari-
ables: family social capital, DCs, value creation, 
paternalism, and historically perceived value creation. 
This latter construct captures historically accumulated 
information concerning value creation, and it is the 
result of a process of “psychological smoothing” 
(Forrester, 1961) through which decision makers create 
an “anchor” to articulate their decision routines. This 
anchoring process is well rooted and documented in the 
management literature (Lant, 1992; Sastry, 1997; 
Schneider, 1992; Sterman, 1987). As discussed earlier, 
each construct can be accumulated over time; it can 
FAMILY SOCIAL
CAPITAL (FSC)
Rate of FSC
Erosion
Inflow FSC Outflow FSC
DYNAMIC
CAPABILITIES
(DC) Outflow DC
Rate of DC
Erosion
Inflow DC
PATERNALISM
(P)Change in
PaternalismEffect ofPaternalism
<Time>
Delay Paternalism
VALUE CREATION
(VC)
Internal
Investments (INV)
Rate of
Investments
Inflow VC
Rate of
Withdrawals
Dividends Paid
(DP) Delay VC
HISTORICALLY
PERCEIVED
VALUE
CREATION
(HPVC) Change in HPVC
Delay HPVC
pressure for FSC
increase (p)
Function of FSC
increase
Delay FSC
Figure 2. The structure of the model
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increase as well as decrease depending on the dynamics 
of the two corresponding flow variables.
Similar to Sastry (1997), we developed formulations 
to yield constructs that are measured in dimensionless 
units through an index function. The scaling of the func-
tions was chosen for convenience, since we did not cali-
brate modeling on empirically collected numerical data, 
but we translated qualitative theorizing crystallized in 
received literature into formal representations (see Larsen 
& Lomi, 1999, 2002; Lomi & Larsen, 1996; Lomi et al., 
2005; Lomi et al., 2010; Sastry, 1997).
First, family social capital (FSC) is sustained as a 
consequence of observed value creation (VC). As such, 
decision makers tend to create an anchor—historical 
perceived value creation (HPVC)—by crystallizing 
information concerning VC:
  
HPVC( Change in HPVC VCt t dt t
t
t
) ( ) ( ).= [ ] +∫
0
0  (1)
   
Change in HPVC VC HPVC
Delay HPVC
( ) ( ) .t t= −   (2)
Thus, decision makers weight the last incoming in-
formation concerning VC with HPVC, which is the an-
chor that crystallizes past values of VC. The higher the 
ratio, which we defined as p, the stronger will be the 
impact on the update process of FSC:
       
p t
t
t
( ) VC( )
HPVC( )= .        (3)
  
FSC( Inflow FSC( ) Outflow FSC( )
FSC( ).
t t t dt
t
t
t
) = −[ ]
+
∫
0
0
 (4)
     
Inflow FSC( ) ( )
Delay FSC
FSC
t
f p
= ,     (5)
where
f p p f fFSC FSC FSCMAX MIN′ > ∀ = =( ) ; ; .0 1 0
 Outflow FSC( ) FSC( ) Rate of Outflow FSC.t t= ∗  (6)
As shown in the Equation (6), FSC erodes under the 
pressure of time at a fixed rate. The inclusion of a rate of 
erosion is necessary since, once accumulated, FSC 
erodes away if not continuously nurtured.
Second, in the model, we represented the process of 
DC evolution:
 
DC( Inflow DC( ) Outflow DC( ) DC( ).t t t dt t
t
t
) = −[ ] +∫
0
0  (7)
     Inflow DC( ) FSCt f P
P
= ∗ ( ),     (8)
where
f fP P′ ′′< <0 0; .
 Outflow DC( ) DC( ) Rate of Outflow DC( ).t t t= ∗   (9)
Third, we modeled the process of paternalism (P), 
which increases as an exogenous function of time:
  
P t t dt P t
t
t
( ) Change in Paternalism( )= [ ] +∫
0
0( ).  (10)
  
Change in Paternalism( )
Delay 
t
f t
P
P
=
( )
,
 
(11)
where
f t f t f tP P P( ) ( ) ( )MAX MIN= = >100 0 0; ; .’
Finally, VC is the result of an accumulation process, 
which follows from DC building, and two processes of 
erosion. The two processes of erosion are connected to 
dividends paid (DP) and internal investments (INV):
 
VC( InflowVC( ) DP( ) INV( ) VC( ).t t t t dt t
t
t
) = − −[ ] +∫
0
0  (12)
     
Inflow VC( ) DC( )
Delay VC
t
t
= .     (13)
  DP( ) VC( ) Rate of Withdrawals.t t= *    (14)
   INV( ) VC( ) Rate of Investments.t t= ∗   (15)
Details regarding parameters and initial values of the 
stocks that we used to simulate the model are reported 
in Appendix B. Values were based on previous case 
study research that specifically explored the relation-
ships presented in our model (Chirico, 2008; Chirico & 
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Nordqvist, 2010; Salvato & Melin, 2008) and used a 
‘link-by-link approach’ (Larsen & Lomi, 1999, 2002; 
Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi et al., 2010) to control the 
match of every single relation and symbolic representa-
tion in the simulation model with the original existing 
literature (see Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Dyer, 1986; 
Eishenardt & Martin, 2000; Pellegrini & Scandura, 
2008; Teece et al., 1997; Salvato & Melin, 2008).
The set of values that we report represents one among 
the many plausible ones that satisfy dimensional consis-
tency criteria. In fact, as it is common in simulation 
research, the numeric values of these casual relations 
had to be calibrated so that they were consistent with 
the other numeric values in the model (cf. internal con-
sistency; see Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi et al., 2010; 
Mollona, 2010).
Additionally, given that existing research has not 
explored the evolution of paternalism over time in fam-
ily firms, we created a time-based monotonic increasing 
function to mimic the impact of paternalism on unfold-
ing dynamics of capability building. The function was 
activated and deactivated to test the impact on the 
model. Furthermore, through extensive experimentation 
and calibration, we found that differences in numerical 
values had only scaling implications for the overall 
behavior of the model. Finally, we have also performed 
some sensitivity runs to check the robustness of our 
simulation model (see robustness checks in the logic of 
enquiry and experiments’ section).
Logic of Enquiry and 
Experiments
The results that we report are obtained by numerical 
integration in 50 time periods.2 To thoroughly explore 
the model’s behavior, we set up an experimentation 
protocol. The protocol was articulated in a number of 
steps directed at both testing the robustness of the model 
and investigating the rich repertoire of behaviors that 
the model produces and that may convey theoretical 
meaning. The gist of our experiment protocol was the 
analysis of model behavior when the paternalism func-
tion was activated or deactivated.
However, to increase the confidence that the computa-
tional representation was stable, we began our analysis by 
further testing our computational representation with 
robustness checks. These checks included four steps. 
First, we used alternative starting values of our constructs 
to confirm that the computational representation was 
robust to alternative initial conditions (see Zott, 2003). 
Second, we performed a large number of experiments 
and calibrations to completely explore the model’s 
behaviors (Forrester & Senge, 1980). As discussed ear-
lier, through these experiments it became possible to 
realize that changing numerical values in the model had 
only scaling implications and did not significantly alter 
the results of the simulation. After verifying that our 
model was reasonably insensitive to the choice of simu-
lation time step––and to keep numerical integration 
errors sufficiently small––we selected a relatively small 
simulation time step (dt = 0.125).3
Third, we ran some extreme-conditions tests to verify 
that our software coding was correct (Barlas, 1996; 
Forrester & Senge, 1980). To start with, we set to zero all 
the stocks of our model to test whether the simulations 
showed what would happen in a similar condition in real 
life—that is, the business cannot be started. In addition, 
we confirmed that the model, when assuming that family 
social capital is equal to zero over time, generates a plau-
sible behavior similar to the honeymoon effect described 
by Fichman and Levinthal (1991), in which expected 
failure of the business intervenes after an initial period of 
activity. Furthermore, we verified that the model pro-
duces creation of value over time when it is assumed that 
a percentage of family social capital is accumulated over 
time. Finally, we ran the simulation for 100 time periods 
to prove that the quality of behavior produced by the 
model was not the consequence of the observation of a 
snapshot of behavior generated in the transient state of 
the underpinning system structure. As expected, the sim-
ulation graphs tend to follow the same path (see Appendix 
C, Figures C.1 and C.2).
Fourth, to further confirm the accuracy of our simu-
lation, we varied some basic assumptions. This approach 
is particularly useful when fundamentally different pro-
cesses may reasonably exist (Davis et al., 2007). For 
instance, we considered a scenario in which paternalism 
was decreasing over time. As expected, in this situation, 
DCs, value creation, and family social capital tend to 
increase over time. This increased our confidence to the 
robustness of the simulation results.
Discussion
In the light of previous theory and empirical research, 
the results of the simulations allow us to formulate 
propositions that addresses our research questions and 
that can guide further research. Figures 3 and 4 show 
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the behavior of the model over 50 time periods. Looking 
at Figure 3A, B, and C obtained in the simulation 
experiments in which paternalism is deactivated, a 
positive feedback loop emerges that connects family 
social capital, DCs, and value creation. Following 
Sterman (2000, pp. 266-268), a positive feedback exists 
if the rate of change is an increasing function of the 
stock. Specifically, over time the higher the level of 
family social capital, the higher are the levels of DC and 
value creation in family firms, which, in turn, lead to 
higher levels of family social capital. The dynamic 
behavior generated by the positive feedback process 
implied by the causal loop is thus an “exponential 
growth.” Thus, we formulate the following proposition:
Proposition 1: A positive feedback loop exists 
among family social capital, dynamic capabili-
ties, and value creation in family firms over time.
The causal links among family social capital, DCs, and 
value creation can be easily detected by looking at the 
relationships between each of the stocks and the behav-
ior of rates of change of a connected other stock. For 
example, when family social capital goes up, the inflow 
into DCs grow as well. Figure 5 shows how the three 
stocks move in a coordinated way; they all increase 
driven by the positive feedback mechanisms. 
Accordingly, we report the behavior between (a) family 
social capital and DCs, (b) between DCs and value cre-
ation, and (c) between value creation and family social 
capital. However, it is important to note that the behav-
ior of each stock is the result of the aggregate contribu-
tion of each connected rate of change. The role of the 
simulation is indeed to tease out the behavior of stocks 
as resulting from the combined pressures of different 
variables.
But what are the limiting factors that prevent family 
social capital, DCs, and value creation from increasing 
indefinitely in family firms? To answer this question, we 
ran a second set of experiments addressing the role of 
paternalism as a feature of family firm culture that may 
limit the accumulation of family social capital, DCs, and 
value creation over time. The simulation results of 
Figure 4A, B, and C suggest that how rapidly (or slowly) 
family social capital is converted into value creation 
depends on the paternalistic feature of the family firm 
culture. Specifically, initially (i.e., during the first 14 
time periods), increasing levels of family social capital 
and low levels of paternalism are associated with high 
rates of DCs and value creation accumulation. In other 
words, during this early period the “asset” side of pater-
nalism, such as loyalty, care, prudence, and support, 
seems to be positive for the firm’s ability to recombine 
resources and create value. Later, higher levels of pater-
nalism produce their pressure to decrease DCs and value 
creation accumulation rates (“liability”; see Figure 4B 
and C).
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Figure 3. Simulation 1
Note. Assumption: Paternalism is deactivated.
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We also notice that in the initial 14 time periods, the 
levels of DCs and value creation result to be higher and 
increase faster when paternalism is activated and 
increases (Figure 4B and C) than when paternalism is 
deactivated (Figure 3B and C). In contrast, after this ini-
tial time period, the levels of DCs and value creation are 
much higher when paternalism is deactivated (Figure 3B 
and C) than when it increases over time (Figure 4B and 
C). This further supports our arguments.
Additionally, we find that family social capital tends 
to grow over time, but the increase is clearly higher 
when paternalism is deactivated. However, in the first 
eight time periods, the level of family social capital is 
the same both when paternalism is absent and when it 
increases over time (see Figure 3A and Figure 4A). This 
means that a culture where paternalism is a feature does 
not affect family relationships at the beginning of the 
firm’s development, but over time paternalism makes 
family relationships less strong, producing lower levels 
of DCs and value creation. Family social capital is typi-
cally accumulating over time (Arregle et al., 2007; 
Salvato & Melin, 2008) as relationships become deeper 
and wider. Our study gives support to the idea that pater-
nalism can halter and finally reduce this accumulation 
of social capital (simulation results are more evident in 
Appendix C, Figures C.1 and C.2). Overall, this means 
that over time the “liability” (or dark) side of paternal-
ism takes over. In formal terms, we formulate the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 2: The effect of paternalism on DCs, 
value creation, and family social capital varies 
over time. Initially, increasing levels of fam-
ily social capital and low levels of paternalism 
are associated with high rates of DCs and value 
creation accumulation. Later, higher levels of 
paternalism produce their pressure to decrease 
DCs, value creation, and family social capital 
accumulation rates.
Paternalism thus displays a negative effect in the 
long term, whereas it is associated with an increase in 
DCs and value creation accumulation in the short term. 
Such a result reflects both theoretical arguments depict-
ing paternalism either as a benevolent or as an authori-
tarian behavior (cf. Pellegrini & Scanduria, 2008). 
Accordingly, our simulation experiments suggest that 
although previous research indicates that the founder 
often displays paternalistic behavior, she or he may be 
an entrepreneurial and caring person who brings a posi-
tive personal imprint to the business. She or he displays 
drive and energy, force of personality, and the desire to 
run things her or his way (Gersick, Davis, McCollom, 
& Lansberg, 1997; Schein, 1983). As Giddings (2003) 
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Figure 4. Simulation 2
Note. Assumption: Paternalism is activated and increases over time.
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explains, the founder is often a paternalistic person, but 
this is good at the beginning of the activity when a men-
tor is needed and offspring must be guided and trained.
However, as time passes, “the founder alone . . . find 
it difficult to have innovative ideas without the fresh 
momentum added to the firm by second-generation 
members” (Salvato, 2004, p. 73). While displaying her 
or his paternalistic behavior, a dominating and auto-
cratic climate derived from a paternalistic culture esca-
lates and makes working conditions difficult for 
offspring (Dyer, 1986, 1988). Such a cultural behavior 
thus leads to path dependency in which “routines that 
worked well in the past are used again and again regard-
less of the strategic challenges facing the family firm” 
(Zahra, 2005, p. 24; see also Chirico et al., in press). 
Path dependency increases the risks of the family firm to 
fall into what Ahuja and Lampert (2001) name a famil-
iarity trap that is searching for solutions in the neighbor-
hood of existing solutions.
In fact, a too dominant and “caring” approach by the 
founder or controlling owner may create conflicts and 
suffocate the ability for other members of the family and 
the firm to contribute to value creation through new 
ideas and change initiatives (Johannisson & Huse, 2000; 
Salvato et al., 2010). The founder may overly centralize 
the decision-making process and take measures to pro-
tect her or his own vision from being challenged. In 
recent conceptual research, it has been suggested that 
such instances of paternalism threaten the loss of posi-
tive family-influenced resources, that is, familiness, 
such as family social capital (Lim et al., 2010). This in 
turn may inhibit DCs and value creation as a result of, 
for instance, lowered risk-taking propensities. This 
rigidity prevents the family firm from having the flexi-
bility to adapt when situations change and tends to trans-
form core capabilities into core rigidities. In this respect, 
Davis and Harveston (1999) refer to a ‘‘generational 
shadow’’ as the enduring effect of previous strategic 
paths and obsolete practices on a family firm’s subse-
quent evolution. The result from our simulation research 
seems to support this notion.
Interestingly, several conceptual and empirical works 
on founders’ and top executives’ tenures strongly cor-
roborate our simulation results. For instance, Rubenson 
and Gupta (1992) argue that founders
tend to (1) be overly dependent on one or two key 
individuals, (2) be highly centralized, (3) lack 
adequate middle-management skills, and (4) 
exhibit a paternalistic atmosphere, . . . character-
istics [that] are incompatible with the needs of a 
mature organization (p. 54),
even though they might enable the nimble structures 
necessary for early growth. Similarly, Jayaraman, 
Khorana, Nelling, and Covin (2000) found that “[F]
ounders create their organizations, yet are often 
expected to eventually become liabilities to these same 
organizations” (p. 1215). Specifically, different schol-
ars (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Henderson, Miller, 
& Hambrick, 2006; Miller, 1991; Miller & Shamsie, 
2001) theorized and empirically found that over time, 
top executives become overly committed to their earlier 
formulas, and their organizations become so tightly 
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Figure 5. The causal links among dynamic capabilities, value 
creation, and family social capital
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aligned with the status quo that change becomes diffi-
cult to consider and even harder to execute. The result 
is an inverted-U relationship between top executives’ 
tenures and firm performance. Also, Henderson et al. 
(2006) show that excessive conservative behaviors and 
negative outcomes emerge on average after about 15 
years of top executives’ tenures. Similar results arise 
from the empirical works of Miller (1991) and Miller 
and Shamsie (2001).
Limitations
We recognize that our study has limitations. First, although 
some researchers argue that creating a “good” theory is 
the central point in theory development, giving less atten-
tion to external validation (Van Maanen, 1995; Weick, 
1989), we recognize that a limitation of our study is 
related with model validation—that is, the match between 
simulation results and empirical “reality.” However, as 
discussed earlier, following Larsen and colleagues (Larsen 
& Lomi, 1999, 2002; Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi et al., 2010), 
we relied on previous case study research and attempted 
to validate our simulation results with a ‘link-by-link 
approach’ (see Chirico & Nordqvist, 2010; Dyer, 1986; 
Eishenardt & Martin, 2000; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008; 
Teece et al., 1997). However, the validity of simulation 
models presents the same problems of any other kind of 
empirical model. Lomi and Larsen (2001) posit that 
“computational and simulation models of organizations 
differ from other kinds of models like empirical models, 
only in terms of the constraints that define the specific 
language being used” (p. 11). In this respect, Sterman 
(2000) agrees that specific validation and verification of 
numerical and simulation models are impossible but this 
is not limited to computer models but to any theory and 
research that relies on simplifications of the real world and 
assumptions.
Second, we did not consider that an authoritarian 
approach can also cause rebellion rather than inertia. In 
some family firms, young generations may react to 
paternalism by rejecting the authority of the older gen-
eration and creating change by revolutionary behaviors. 
Third, it is well known that private family firms value 
not only financial performance but also noneconomic 
socioemotional factors such as maintaining family influ-
ence over the firm for generations (Gómez-Mejía et al., 
2007, p. 106). Our choice to focus on financial value 
creation is a limitation that should be addressed in future 
research.
Finally, our results can be interpreted only in a rela-
tive sense through time periods, given that our con-
structs are dimensionless index functions by 
construction (i.e., dimensionless units; Larsen & Lomi, 
1999; Lomi et al., 2010; Sastry, 1997). Simulation 
experiments indeed do not predict the future but just 
provide consistent stories about the future (Morecroft 
& Sterman 1994, pp. 17-18). Our results, however, 
could open an intriguing avenue for further empirical 
research since the translation of generic units of time, 
within which specific phenomena occur in specific time 
units (e.g., months, quarters, years), is an interesting 
empirical issue.
Future Research
In the future, more accurate scenarios of paternalism 
could be formalized after empirical research, and 
some components of the model may be disaggre-
gated to focus on particular issues related to family 
firms. For instance, paternalism may be described by 
a stepwise function related to the generation running 
the family firm.4 Additionally, paternalism may be 
articulated into benevolent, exploitative, authorita-
tive and authoritarian paternalism (see Pellegrini 
& Scandura, 2008), and DCs into resource acquisi-
tion, exchange, transformation, and shedding (see 
Eishenardt & Martin, 2000). Such specifications 
may clarify the “true” relationship between the dif-
ferent components of paternalism and DCs. This may 
also further explain the nonlinear effects found in 
this study and whether or not it may occur at the 
beginning of each new generation when a new fam-
ily generation takes over. Paternalism may also dif-
ferently affect family firms depending on their 
different ownership and governance structures across 
generations (e.g., controlling owner, sibling partner-
ship, or cousin consortium; see Gersick et al., 1997), 
as well as depending on whether they are private or 
public. Additionally, high levels of DCs may pre-
sumably enable a firm to adjust the behavior of its 
members such as excessive paternalism. Thus, 
reverse causalities, for instance, from DCs to pater-
nalism or from DCs to family social capital, need to 
be explored.5
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Finally, future research should be also directed to 
test our propositions with empirical data. Our simula-
tion results will thus serve as a basis for subsequent 
empirical work to assess their correspondence with 
observable behavior (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 
2007). However, given the difficulty to collect longitu-
dinal statistical data on sensitive constructs such as 
paternalism, an alternative approach may be to compare 
our simulation results with more detailed case study 
data to enable granular validation (i.e., whether the sim-
ulation is consistent with the specific details of multiple 
case studies).
Implications for Practice
This research has also practical implications. Value cre-
ation in family firms depends on the ability of top man-
agers to “solicit many ideas from a lot of people” 
(Aronoff & Ward, 1997, p. 26). It is, therefore, impor-
tant over time not to restrict the strategic thinking to the 
top management team but to view members at all levels 
of the organization as potential entrepreneurs. This per-
spective suggests that all members of the organization 
must be encouraged to make suggestions and take ini-
tiatives on their own. However, if the organizational 
culture is not supportive, the organization’s chances of 
arriving at a participative decision-making environment 
are quite small. Accordingly, Chirico and Nordqvist 
(2010) found that inefficient resource management, 
along with its negative effect on the family firm’s value 
creation, often results from a paternalistic culture in 
which the latest generation is
in the shadow of the previous generations . . . and 
strategic decisions are always taken by them in a 
non-participative atmosphere . . . that . . . shape[s] 
and limit[s] family members’ innovative initia-
tives and directly or indirectly restrict their 
choices so as to cause inertia. (p. 14)
Thus, the organizational culture is essential for entrepre-
neurship in family firms.
Conclusions
Drawing on system dynamics methods and simulation 
experiments, this article offers an interpretation of the 
associations between family social capital, DCs, and 
value creation. In particular, we focus on the role of 
paternalism as a feature of family firm culture on these 
relationships. Bothner and White (2001) posit that
simulation models are always formulated as 
mechanisms for simplifying the moving parts of a 
social process down to it core features. Such 
endeavors succeed when, in reducing the real 
world complexity, they nearly inviolate the estab-
lished facts and yield surprising insights for fur-
ther exploration. (p. 206)
Empirical studies usually ignore the complex feedback 
structure linking individual propositions or hypotheses 
for the purpose of specifying estimable statistical mod-
els. By using simulation methods, we were able to 
exploit the rich dynamic feedback structure linking the 
constructs of our interest.
More specifically, we have set out to address two 
research questions reflective of the dual aim of our 
research:
Research Question 1: How and when does pater-
nalism affect DCs and by association value 
creation in family firms?
Research Question 2: How can simulation experi-
ments shed light on complex decision pro-
cesses in family firms?
Accordingly, our study offers both theoretical and 
methodological contributions. First, the present article 
sheds new light on the relational (Arregle et al., 2007) 
and cultural (Zahra et al., 2004) mechanisms through 
which value creation is generated in private family 
firms. Specifically, through simulation experiments, we 
developed two propositions on the nature and dynamic 
interaction among family social capital, DCs, value 
creation, and paternalism.
Interesting results emerge regarding the role of pater-
nalism on resource recombination processes in family 
firms. In this respect, our study shows that the founder’s 
paternalism may be seen as positive as it helps guide and 
train the next generation in the initial stage of the activ-
ity when the two generations start working together. But 
as time passes, a dominating and autocratic climate may 
escalate and make working conditions difficult for the 
new generation. Put differently, the founder’s strong, 
hard-driving qualities that were essential at the earlier 
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business stages (Schein, 1983) become less critical as 
the business grows and matures. A growing paternalistic 
behavior “may prove to be increasingly less functional 
over time and may actually sow the seeds for an organi-
zation that is ill equipped to change and adapt in the face 
of new business realities and demands.” In other words, 
“[T]he very strengths that help a family business get off 
the ground can ultimately lead to its undoing” (Giddings, 
2003, p. 40). Paradoxically, the cause of failure may 
reside in what was once the source of success.
This result enables us to better understand the phe-
nomenon of paternalism both in family and nonfamily 
firm research and practice as it sheds new light on the 
extant contradicting theoretical arguments that depict 
paternalism as either a benevolent (e.g., Redding et al., 
1994) or authoritarian behavior (e.g., Uhl-Bien & 
Maslyn, 2005), or both (e.g., Farh & Cheng, 2000). Our 
research suggests that paternalism may produce positive 
or negative outcomes based on its level (i.e., low or 
high) and the specific time in which this behavior occurs 
(i.e., early stage or later stage of the firm). Our work 
also extends the existing family firm literature by mov-
ing beyond the static emphasis on family resources 
inherent for instance in the concept of “familiness” 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999) and examines not only 
the endowment of resources but also their actual use and 
challenges in value creating activities (Eddleston, 
Kellermanns, & Sarathy, 2008).
Second, new and alternative methodological appro-
aches are needed to develop the family business field of 
research and to address fundamental questions about fam-
ily firms. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the 
first effort to adopt a simulation method in a family firm 
context. In fact, an aim in this article was to provide an 
explanation and overview of simulation methodology. 
Computer simulation can be a powerful way to do science. 
Simulation “makes it possible to study problems that are 
not easy to address—or are impossible to address—with 
other scientific approaches” (Harrison et al., 2007, p. 
1243). Because organizations, especially private family 
firms, are complex systems and many of their characteris-
tics and behaviors are often inaccessible to researchers, 
especially over time, simulation can be a particularly use-
ful research tool for family firm scholars. Using systems 
dynamics and simulation experiments, we were able to put 
together some pieces derived from the existing rather frag-
mented research on DCs, value creation, and the role of 
paternalism in family firms and to propose an integrated 
dynamic model.
Finally, we contend that our analysis may help better 
understand competitive actions and patterns involving 
other organizational forms than family firms. At least 
some of the features of the relationships that occur in the 
family firm context could probably generalize to other 
organizations (see Arregle et al., 2007). Recently, Pearce 
(2005) claimed that paternalism is never completely 
removed from even the most rationalistic organizations. 
Thus, relational and cultural behaviors existing in family 
firms may be similarly developed in other types of orga-
nizations, especially those characterized by strong ties 
and emotional commitments.
Appendix A
Feedback Loops and Stocks and Flows
As reported by S. Gary and Larsen (2000), in a feedback 
loop diagram the arrow linking any two variables, x and 
y, indicates a causal relationship exists between x and y. 
The sign at the head of each arrow denotes the nature of 
the relationship as follows:
x y
y
x
+
 → ⇒ >
∂
∂
0
and
x y
y
x
−
 → ⇒ <
∂
∂
0.
An arrow from x to y with a positive sign signifies 
that the partial derivative of y with respect to x is posi-
tive; and an arrow with a negative sign indicates a nega-
tive partial derivative. Moreover, the polarity of each 
feedback loop is determined by tracing through the 
effects of each link, starting with any variable, until the 
loop is closed. If the net effect is to reinforce an initial 
change in the variable chosen as the starting point, the 
loop is positive and labeled with the letter R (reinforc-
ing loop). If an initial change is counteracted, the loop is 
negative and labeled with the letter B (balancing loop):
a. Reinforcing Loop (R) is a structure that feeds on 
itself to produce growth or decline: “State 1” (the 
cause) increases or decreases “State 2” (the effect), 
which, in turn, increases or decreases “State 1,” 
respectively. In other words, R tends to reinforce 
or amplify whatever is happening in the system:
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b. However, nothing grows forever. There must 
be some limits to growth that are created by 
negative feedbacks (Sterman, 2000). Balanc-
ing Loop (B) counteracts and opposes change. 
It attempts to move some “Current State” to a 
“Desired State” (it is assumed that “Current 
State” is lower than “Desired State”) through 
some “Action”: the “Desired State” interacts 
with the “Current State” to produce a “Gap.” 
The larger the “Gap” the stronger the influence 
to produce “Action.” The “Action” taken then 
moves the “Current State” toward the “Desired 
State,” reducing the “Gap” to zero:
Stocks and flows are the basic building blocks of a 
system dynamics model (see Figure A.1), which generate 
delays and enable scholars to analyze the feedback loops 
of the system. A stock is an entity that is accumulated over 
time by inflows and depleted by outflows. It accumulates 
past events characterizing the state of the system. A stock 
typically has a certain value at each moment of time (e.g., 
family social capital). Mathematically, a stock (S) can be 
seen as an integration (accumulation) of the difference 
between inflow and outflow (F) in the long term:
Parameters
Sector Variable Type Value
HPVC HPVC Initial value 0.1
HPVC Delay HPVC Constant 3
FSC FSC Initial value 2
FSC Rate of FSC 
erosion
Constant 0.03
FSC Delay FSC Constant 3
DC DC Initial value 0.1
DC Rate of DCs 
erosion
Constant 0.05
VC VC Initial value 0.1
VC Delay VC Constant 3
VC Rate of 
withdrawals
Constant 0.05
VC Rate of 
Investments
Constant 0.1
P P Initial value 1
P Delay P Constant 3
Note. HPVC = historically perceived value creation; DC = dynamic  
capability; FSC = family social capital; VC = value creation; P = paternalism.
S t t dt S tt
t
t
= −[ ] +∫ Inflow Outflow( ) ( ) ( ).0 0
A flow changes a stock over time by inflows and out-
flows (e.g., inflow and outflow of family social capital). 
It is typically measured over a certain interval of time. 
Mathematically, a flow (F) can be seen as the derivative 
of the stock (S) with respect to the time (t), that is, its net 
rate of change:
F F
dS
dt
= − =inflow outflow; .
Moreover, stocks are the source of delays. A delay is 
the amount of time by which an event is retarded. It is 
the time between the instant at which a given event 
occurs and the instant at which a related aspect of that 
event occurs. Delays are responsible for generating 
effects that are very often nonlinear and counterintuitive 
in the real world (Sterman, 2000).
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Figure A.1. Stock and flows
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Figure C.1. Simulation 3
Note. Assumption: Paternalism is deactivated.
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Figure C.2. Simulation 4
Note. Assumption: Paternalism is activated and increases over time.
Appendix C
Simulation Results in 100 Time Periods
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Appendix B
Equations and Parameters
Indications coming from theory are rarely sufficiently 
detailed to define model specification uniquely. 
Assumptions are typically needed to translate theoreti-
cal statements about causal relations among variables 
into a computable (or estimable) model. To make the 
results reported fully reproducible, in Appendix B, we 
report the equations and parameters we used to set the 
model in motion (see Lomi et al., 2005; Lomi et al., 
2010; Mollona, 2010; Sterman, 2000).
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Notes
1. However, some other scholars argue that simulation 
methods often yield very little in terms of actual 
theory development. They suggest that simulations 
either replicate the obvious or strip away so much 
realism that they are simply too inaccurate to yield 
valid theoretical insights (Fine & Elsbach, 2000).
2. We used Vensim (Version PLE 5.10a), a software 
package designed for system dynamics simulation. 
To reduce the risk of reporting software-specific 
results, in terms, for example, of small differences in 
the results of the employed numerical integration 
method, the model was rebuilt and simulated with 
Powersim (Version 2.5), another popular software 
used for system dynamics modeling. The results 
obtained were identical.
3. It indicates that the results of simulation are saved 
eight times in each time step.
4. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this 
insightful comment.
5. We thank the editors and reviewers for these helpful 
insights.
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